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INTRODUCTION 
This Note examines the background of foreign-cubed litigation,1
 
 
including its development over the past four decades, its abrogation by 
the Supreme Court, and its potential future under recently enacted 
legislation.  The Note examines the tests developed by the Court of 
Appeals in order to determine whether a United States court could 
adjudicate foreign-cubed litigation.  Additionally, it reviews the 
Supreme Court opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank and its 
ultimate rejection of the predominant Second Circuit test for 
applicability. Finally, the Note discusses “The Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” a provision of which was 
specifically included to overturn the result in the Morrison decision, its 
potential impact on future foreign-cubed litigation, and how the courts, 
litigants, and foreign nations should look to proceed in its wake. 
I. FOREIGN-CUBED LITIGATION: BACKGROUND 
A. SECURITIES LAWS: A BRIEF HISTORY 
The issues and events surrounding the stock market crash known as 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law;  M.A., 2007, Brooklyn 
College, City University of New York;  B.S., 2005, Brooklyn College, City University 
of New York.  I would like to thank my wife, Valerie, for her support, encouragement, 
and patience throughout the Note process.  I would also like to thank my family and 
friends, and particularly David Slarskey for his insightful feedback. 
 1. Foreign-cubed (“F-cubed”) litigation is generally described as an action 
between a foreign investor and a foreign issuer whose securities are listed on a foreign 
exchange. See e.g. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Securities Litigation, 2009 SEC. L. 
REV. § 1:5 (2010) (discussing the origin and development of F-Cubed litigation). 
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“The Great Crash” in 1929 caused a sense of fear and instability among 
the investing public who questioned the soundness of the nation’s 
financial institutions.2  Stock prices on the New York Stock Exchange 
had fallen dramatically in October 1929, culminating in a close of 198 
points from a previous high of 381 points in September 1929.3  While 
many factors were blamed for the crash, the most commonly accepted 
reasons were the lack of clarity, honesty, and availability of reliable 
financial information regarding securities that were being sold.4  The 
lack of such information was believed to have prevented investors from 
making informed investment decisions.  In his address to Congress on 
May 29, 1933, President Roosevelt articulated a need for regulations 
requiring that “every issue of new securities to be sold . . . be 
accompanied by full publicity and information . . . .”5  Shortly thereafter, 
Congress passed, and the President signed, the Securities Act of 1933, 
also known as the Truth in Securities Act or more commonly, the ‘33 
Act.6
The ‘33 Act required the registration of the offering and sale of any 
securities that are to be sold using the means and instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, unless an exemption applies.
 
7  The following year 
brought the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“‘34 
Act”).8  Placed in section 2 of the ‘34 Act were the reasons set forth for 
regulation of the securities market, including, but not limited to, 
requiring “appropriate reports, remov[ing] impediments to and 
perfect[ing] the mechanisms of a national market system for securities . . 
. .”9
 
 2. See Stock Market Crash of 1929, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/566754/stock-market-crash-of-1929 (last 
visited June 19, 2011). 
  Among the most important sections of the act is the antifraud 
 3. Id. 
 4. James M. Landis, Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959) (discussing the political and financial atmosphere 
following the market crash of 1929). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77a-77aa (2006)). 
 7. Id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a (containing the ‘33 Act registration requirement). See § 
4(2) for exemptions from registration (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d  
(2006)). 
 8. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78a-78oo (2006)). 
 9. Id. § 2. 
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provision under section 10(b).10  Rule 10b-5, promulgated under section 
10(b) allows for criminal and/or private party causes of actions against 
individuals that scheme to defraud or make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omit to state a material fact, or to engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security.11  Generally considered the workhorse of public and 
private securities enforcement, Rule 10b-5 allegations are often brought 
as class-actions and occasionally by foreign investors for the purchase of 
foreign securities traded on foreign exchanges, a phenomenon known as 
“foreign-cubed” (“f-cubed”) litigation.12
B. THE ‘33 AND ‘34 ACT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF F-CUBED LITIGATION 
 
The mechanism for a foreign investor seeking to avail itself of U.S. 
law for fraud in the issuance of foreign securities listed on a foreign 
exchange is found in the interplay of the following sections: under 
section 11 of the ‘33 Act, a material misrepresentation or omission in a 
registration statement will subject an issuer and others associated with 
an issuer (underwriters and dealers) to rescissory damages (return of 
purchase price of the security) in a suit brought by purchasers of said 
securities pursuant to the registration statement.13  Under section 
12(a)(1) of the ‘33 Act, an issuer who sells or offers to sell a security in 
violation of section 5 by failing to register said offering or failing to 
successfully secure an exemption can be liable for rescissory damages as 
well.14  Finally, under §17 of the ‘33 Act, the SEC can bring civil and 
criminal actions against a party who issues securities and “employ[s] 
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud[.]”15
 
 10. Id. § 10(b). 
  Assuming a foreign 
issuer fails to register its offering with the SEC, and that offering 
somehow (even in a minute manner, as will be examined further) 
purportedly affects the securities market in the United States, under 
foreign-cubed jurisprudence, suit may be brought in a U.S. court by 
 11. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(1948). 
 12. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Securities Act § 11. 
 14. See id. § 12(a)(2). 
 15. See id. § 17. 
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foreign plaintiffs.16
The most common action brought pursuant to the ‘34 Act is under 
Rule 10b-5.
 
17  This rule provides for wide-sweeping coverage of 
purchases or sales of a security where a “means or instrumentality” of 
interstate commerce is used to defraud an investor or by the means of 
making an “untrue statement” or omission of material information.18  
Often considered the “catch-all” fraud provision under the securities 
laws, Rule 10b-5 allows foreign investors to seek actual (rather than just 
rescissory) damages for statements or omissions made in connection 
with the sale or purchase of a security by arguing that such foreign 
transactions fit within f-cubed framework.19
 
 
II. FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS AND THEIR ACTIONABILITY UNDER  
THE ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES LAWS 
F-cubed actions are generally brought against foreign issuers of 
securities on behalf of foreign investors who purchased these securities 
on a foreign exchange.20  While initial thoughts may be that such claims 
should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction21 or forum 
non-conveniens,22 courts over the years developed a framework to see if 
and when such claims should be heard in a U.S. forum.23  In a similar 
context, under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court had permitted the 
selective application of statutory extraterritorial application of U.S. laws 
to foreign defendants when it was decided that the activity alleged 
affected U.S. markets.24
 
 16. See supra note 1. 
  Such a phenomenon is often referred to as 
 17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78a, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006). See 
also James P. Jalil, Proposals for Insider Trading Regulation After the Fall of the 
House of  Enron, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 689, 703 (2003) (referring to Rule 10b-
5 as the “workhorse of securities enforcement.”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See 6 THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
412 (2009). 
 20. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 21. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
 22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1948) (codifying the common law concept of forum non 
conveniens). 
 23. Langevoort, supra note 1, § 1:5. 
 24. See Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, The Continuing Evolution of 
Securities Cases, 2009 WIS. L. REV 465, 468 (2009) (discussing the two most recent 
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“jurisdiction to prescribe.”25  That authority was often cited as 
warranting extraterritorial reach for U.S. securities laws.26
A. SECOND CIRCUIT DEVELOPS TESTS TO GUIDE  
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE SECURITIES LAWS 
 
1. Development and Application of the “Conduct Test” 
Prior to Morrison,27 the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether 
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be applied in cases of securities fraud.  
In this void, the lower courts had developed their own set of tests for 
determining the extraterritorial application of the securities laws.28  One 
factor that courts looked to, known as the “conduct test,” was articulated 
in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., in which Judge Friendly held that 
there was “no reason to extend [the ‘34 Act] to cases where the United 
States activities are merely preparatory or take the form of culpable 
nonfeasance and are relatively small in comparison to those abroad,” but 
rather conduct related to the fraud must have occurred within the United 
States.29  The Court posited that when “a court is confronted with 
transactions that . . .  are predominantly foreign, it must seek to 
determine whether Congress would have wished the precious resources 
of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to 
them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries” to adjudicate on 
their own.30
Judge Friendly held that the amount of activity that occurred within 
the United States was irrelevant when the securities in question were 
sold to purchasers within the United States.
 
31
 
Supreme Court decisions on jurisdiction to prescribe). 
  He was essentially 
looking for substantial conduct related to the fraud to have at least 
occurred in the United States in order to justify an extraterritorial 
application of the securities laws to sales that occurred outside of the 
 25. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
237 (1987). 
 26. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 27. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 28. Id. at 2889 (discussing the development of the “conduct” and “effects” tests). 
 29. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975) (emphasis 
added). 
 30. Id. at 985. 
 31. Id. at 987. 
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United States on foreign exchanges from foreign issuers.32  The test 
itself was not very clear and often led to court interpretations that relied 
on determining whether the conduct in question had an adverse effect on 
American investors and the American securities markets.33  Shortly after 
the decision in Bersch, the District Court in the Southern District of New 
York stated that not only must there be some sort of conduct in the 
United States, it also cannot simply be preparatory conduct, but rather 
the conduct must have used the United States as a base of operations for 
manufacturing fraudulent security devices leading to a more difficult 
standard to satisfy.34
Building on the Second Circuit’s decision in Bersch, the Third 
Circuit held two years later that even if the sole victim was a foreign 
entity it would “grant jurisdiction in transnational securities cases where 
at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occur[ed] 
within this country.”
 
35  Failure to apply the law would, from a policy 
perspective, “embolden those who wish to defraud foreign securities 
purchasers or sellers to use the United States as a base of operations.”36
(1) the conduct in question in relation to plaintiff’s theory of fraud; 
(2) the location of the relevant conduct; (3) the timeline of relevant 
acts; (4) the materiality or substantiality of the relevant conduct; (5) 
the causal connection between the domestic conduct and the alleged 
losses; and (6) considerations of “reasonableness gauged by the 
intent of congressional policy and principles of fairness in the 
  
As the test developed further, various courts interpreted the rules to look 
for different factors within each case.  Recently, the court in Terra 
Securities ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc. articulated the test in a 
manner combining the factors of previous cases to decide whether the 
conduct had occurred in the United States and whether it was sufficient 
to warrant extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Among the various factors the 
court considered were: 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. George K. Chamberlin, Annotation, Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Securities 
Fraud Action Based on Foreign Transactions, Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
56 A.L.R. FED. 288 § 4(b) (1982). 
 34. Venture Fund (Int’l) N.V. v. Willkie Farr and Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550, 
555 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (referring to Judge Friendly’s decision elaborating on the conduct 
test in IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1016, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 35. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 36. Id. at 116. 
2011] MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK: 579 
LIFE AFTER DODD-FRANK 
 
circumstances surrounding the particular case.”37
Moreover, the court expressed that the factors were not to be “weighed 
independently of the others; rather they must be considered in 
conjunction.”
 
38  This decision was the exact opposite of a 1983 Second 
Circuit decision that held that a plaintiff need only satisfy either the 
conduct or the effects test to support a finding of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.39
2. Development and Application of the “Effects Test” 
 
While courts were consistently applying and developing the 
“conduct test,” it was often done alongside a test that purported to test 
the effects such a transaction had on domestic markets. This came to be 
known as the “effects test.”  In 1968, the Second Circuit held that 
extraterritorial application also applied to transactions that occurred 
“outside the United States, at least when the transactions involve stock 
registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and are 
detrimental to the interests of American investors.”40  Here the court 
took an expansive view of the term “effects” and in its determination 
took into consideration the harm that could occur to the stock price of 
the American subsidiary of a Canadian corporations stock when certain 
frauds and misrepresentations were made to affect the value of the 
Canadian stock.41  This outlook was tempered by the court’s holding in 
Bersch stating that “adverse effects on this country’s general economic 
effects or American security prices” was not sufficient to apply 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to the foreign defendants.42
As discussed earlier, the securities laws were passed in part to 
restore confidence and stability and to help support fair and honest 
 
 
 37. Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 303, 309 
(S.D.N.Y 2010). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 40. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 41. Id. at 208-09 (holding that “ impairment of the value of American investments 
by sales by the issuer in a foreign country, allegedly in violation of the Act, has in our 
view, a sufficiently serious effect upon United States commerce to warrant assertion of 
jurisdiction for the protection of American investors and consideration of the merits of 
plaintiff’s claim”). 
 42. See Choi & Silberman, supra note 24, at 475-76 (citing Bersch and discussing 
the tempering of the decision in Schoenbaum). 
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markets.43  However, such a Wickard-like application of this test, as 
found in Schoenbaum, was overly broad in that almost any securities 
transaction that occurred outside of the United States could have 
conceivably been determined to have had an economic impact on 
domestic markets and securities prices. 44  In general, the courts tended 
to use a somewhat tempered view when determining the effects of 
securities misrepresentations outside of domestic markets. In In re 
Parmalat Securities Litigation, the district court held that even though 
false statements were made outside the United States regarding a foreign 
corporation’s offerings, the representatives knew that American 
investors would rely on such information, thus satisfying the effects 
test.45
A more obvious effect on the American markets was on display 
when a defendant knowingly illegally acquired and operated an 
American subsidiary and subsequently incorporated the subsidiary’s 
earnings into its financial statements, which were then distributed to 
Canadian investors.
 
46  Such illegal conduct negatively impacted the 
price of both Canadian and American shares, thus satisfying the effects 
test.47  Interestingly enough, when the District Court in the Southern 
District of New York was confronted with the issue of American 
purchasers of unsponsored American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”)48
 
 43. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
 
of a foreign corporation (that were trading exclusively on a foreign 
exchange via an over-the-counter transaction), the court held that since 
the securities offered were exclusively in Europe by a European 
corporation on a European exchange “lacking any nexus to American 
securities markets, [the facts in question were] not enough to satisfy the 
 44. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (applying a very broad 
interpretation of the commerce clause to prevent a farmer from growing wheat for his 
own consumption outside of price supporting regulation; insisting that allowing such 
conduct would broadly impair the overall market for wheat and therefore permitted the 
restraint of such behavior). 
 45. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 46. In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 47. Id. 
 48. The stocks of most foreign companies that trade in the U.S. markets are traded 
as American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”). U.S. depository banks issue these stocks. 
Such investments are often not authorized by the foreign company. See American 
Depositary Receipts, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/adrs.htm (last visited June 19, 2011) 
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effects test.”49
If a foreign corporation has no interest (at least in a specific 
transaction) in being involved in American exchanges or markets and 
additionally has not authorized the trading of its stock on OTC markets, 
it should not be dragged into American courts for transactions that 
occurred outside its purview.
  While the conclusion seemed logical, the opposing 
argument could have just as easily been successful given the breadth of 
the Schoenbaum test. 
50  On the other hand, the court basically 
put Americans who have an interest in trading such securities on notice 
that they must be aware of the risks, rewards, and uncertain remedies 
that could come with such an investment.51
3. Jurisdiction to Prescribe (Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Laws) 
 
As a general rule, legislation does not reach foreign defendants 
acting in foreign territories.52  The Restatement of Foreign Relations 
Law section 402 states that “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with 
respect to . . . conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place 
within its territory . . . .”53  Section 403 then discusses the 
reasonableness of prescribing jurisdiction when certain factors are 
present.54
 
 49. In re European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. Sec. Litig., 703 F. Supp. 2d 
348, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quotation altered); see also Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 
2d 498, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that unauthorized ADRs purchased in over-the-
counter market by American investors failed to have “substantial” effects on domestic 
markets). 
  Factors cited include, but are not limited to, the link of the 
activity to the regulating state, the interest another state may have in 
 50. “OTC” or Over-the-Counter markets are inter-dealer trades of securities that 
are not listed on national securities exchanges. Such securities have differing or non-
existent reporting requirements in the United States and are not as heavily regulated as 
the national exchanges. See Over-the-Counter Markets, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrotc.shtml (last visited June 19, 
2011); see also OTC 101, OTC MARKETS, http://www.otcmarkets.com/learn/ 
market-structure (last visited June 19, 2011). 
 51. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 52. 48 C.J.S. International Law § 18 (2010) (except in respect to American 
nationals, the Constitution of the United States and the laws passed in pursuance thereof 
have no force in foreign territory). 
 53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§402 (1987). 
 54. Id. §403. 
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regulating such activity, and the likelihood of conflict with regulation by 
another state.55  Most importantly, the “presumption that federal law is 
not meant to have extraterritorial effect is applicable in all cases, 
whenever a party seeks to give any federal legislation extraterritorial 
effect, including cases arising under the Securities Exchange Act.”56
In a heavily cited opinion involving the application of Title VII, the 
Supreme Court held that “[i]t is a longstanding principle of American 
law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is 
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.”
  
The inconsistent application of this presumption is reflected by contrary 
outcomes in foreign-cubed cases. 
57  The Court continued that this “canon of construction . . . is a 
valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be 
ascertained” and serves to protect against unintended clashes between 
“our laws and those of other nations which could result in international 
discord.”58 Although the case mentioned was a Title VII action, the 
decision of which was later overturned by statute, the concept is still 
applicable and was cited by the Court in the Morrison decision.59
The Supreme Court later stated that while “[a]cts of Congress do 
not ordinarily apply outside our borders . . . [w]hen it desires to do so, 
Congress knows how to place [foreign territories] within the 
jurisdictional reach of a statute.”
 
60  Until the enactment of the “Dodd-
Frank” bill post-Morrison, neither the ‘33 Act nor the ‘34 Act made any 
mention of extraterritorial application.61
III. MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK - SECURITIES LAW 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY DECIDED 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
On June 24th, 2010 the Supreme Court finally issued a decision 
concerning the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act, turning 
 
 55. Id. §403(2)(a), (g), (h). 
 56. 79A C.J.S. Securities Regulation § 123 (2010). 
 57. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 58. Id. 
 59. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 60. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 174 (1993). 
 61. See Dodd-Frank, infra note 128; Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa 
(2006); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006). 
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decades of precedent on its head.62  In Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank, the Court addressed an action brought by four Australians63 
against what was at one point the largest bank in Australia.64  The 
plaintiffs alleged that in 1998, National Australia Bank (“NAB”) bought 
co-defendant Homeside Lending Inc., a mortgage servicing company, in 
order to expand NAB’s operations.65  Homeside’s business plan 
depended on the presumption that mortgages would not be prepaid or 
terminated in any fashion, so that its clients would continue to require its 
services.66  As a subsidiary of NAB, Homeside’s valuations were 
dependent on this presumption and subsequently appeared in NAB’s 
consolidated financial statements.67  On July 5, 2001, NAB announced a 
“write-down” of Homeside’s assets by $450 million citing increased 
mortgage prepayments.68 The following quarter brought about another 
write-down of $1.75 billion.69
Following the ensuing decline of NAB’s share price on the 
Australian exchange, as well as a corresponding drop of its 
(unsponsored) ADRs, plaintiffs brought an action in District Court for 
the Southern District of New York alleging Homeside’s financial 
models fraudulently predicted prepayment at “unrealistically low” 
levels.
 
70  The complaint alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of 
the ‘34 Act71 and of SEC Rule 10b-5.72
 
 62. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
  Plaintiffs alleged that NAB’s 
 63. Id. at 2876 (ironically, Morrison, the Petitioner’s namesake, himself an 
American, had his case dismissed for failure to state damages, but he continued to be 
named as the petitioner in the case). 
 64. Id. at 2875. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Risks can include prepayment for or risk of overall default on the loan being 
serviced; in such situations, servicing would no longer be necessary for the loan in 
question. See JEFF MADURA, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 214 (Michelle 
Baird et al. eds., 8th ed. 2008). 
 67. For a description of why and how corporations create consolidated financial 
statements, see BELVERD E. NEEDLES, JR. ET AL., FINANCIAL & MANAGERIAL 
ACCOUNTING 630-38 (8th ed. 2008). 
 68. A write down is allowed when an investment is deemed impaired. See STEVEN 
M. BRAGG, WILEY GAAP POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 150 (2d ed. 2008). 
 69. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875-76. 
 70. Id. at 2876. 
 71. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78a, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78oo (2006). 
 72. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876. 
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management was aware of this material fallacy and failed to act.73  
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 
for failure to state a claim.74
The District Court dismissed the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the conduct alleged was “at 
most, a link in the chain of an alleged securities fraud scheme that 
culminated abroad.”
 
75 Moreover, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ claim 
that but-for the domestic conduct the fraud would not have occurred, did 
not fit into the Rule 10b-5 framework.76
B. SUPREME COURT DECISION 
  The petitioners, all Australians, 
had sought to represent a class of foreign purchasers of NAB’s shares in 
a period prior to the write-down. 
Prior to announcing the unanimous decision, Justice Scalia 
addressed a threshold issue regarding an error that the lower court had 
made (based on decades of erroneous precedent) regarding whether the 
question of securities law extraterritoriality was in fact an issue of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.77  The Court clarified that the decision of 
whether section 10(b) reached extraterritorial conduct was actually a 
merits questions, whereas the question of subject-matter jurisdiction 
refers “to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.”78  While the result in the 
lower Morrison decision would not have changed, the court felt it 
necessary to clarify that it is without question that the District Court had 
the jurisdiction to hear the case under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.79  The Court 
refused to remand stating that doing so “would only require a new Rule 
12(b)(6) label for the same Rule 12(b)(1) conclusion.80
 
 73. Id. 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. See In re Nat’l. Aus. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 
3844465, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
 78. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted versus lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction). 
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C. PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
After addressing the issue of procedural housekeeping, the Court 
reiterated its earlier decisions regarding the general application of 
American law outside of the United States territories.81  The Court, 
quoting its decision in Aramco and other cases, reaffirmed the notion 
that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none.”82 This statement set the tone for the rest of the 
opinion.83 Justice Scalia proceeded to note that regardless of how many 
times the Supreme Court had recited the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in their previous opinions, the Second Circuit, and 
other circuits following suit, essentially disregarded this precedent and 
felt it necessary to “discern whether Congress would have wanted the 
statute to apply” extraterritorially, thereby “divining” a set of tests that 
were “complex in formulation and unpredictable in application.”84  The 
Court noted that until 1967 the district courts in the Southern District of 
New York had stayed within the letter of the law by not interpreting 
securities laws as applying outside of the United States.85  However, the 
Second Circuit’s reversal of the District Court in the Schoenbaum case 
set the courts on a path to an application that would soon be expanded in 
subsequent cases, essentially “excis[ing] the presumption against 
extraterritoriality” from federal jurisprudence.86
Justice Scalia mentioned the development of the conduct and 
effects tests, with palpable sarcasm, referring to them as the “north star 
of the Second Circuit’s section 10(b) jurisprudence, pointing the way to 
what Congress would have wished.”
 
87  Moreover, the Court mentioned 
that while other Circuits had adopted the test, albeit with their own 
variations, one Court of Appeals had criticized the test and its 
“interpretive assumptions” but still decided to defer to the Second 
Circuit because of its “preeminence in the field of securities law[.]”88
 
 81. Id. at 2877-78 
 
 82. Id. at 2878. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 2878-79. 
 87. Id. at 2879. 
 88. Id. at 2880 (noting Judge Bork’s observation that a “more natural inquiry might 
be what jurisdiction Congress in fact . . . conferred” rather than assuming (citing 
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987))). 
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Concurring with the many scholarly criticisms that had been 
volleyed against the Second Circuit’s line of reasoning, the Court 
reiterated the wisdom and simplicity of a presumption against 
extraterritoriality stating that “[r]ather than guess anew in each case” the 
presumption should be adhered to and provide for the legislative process 
to take its course.89
Continuing in its analysis, the Court maintained that since Rule 
10b-5 was promulgated under section § 10(b) of the ‘34 Act, it is subject 
to the contours of section § 10 and “[t]herefore, if section § 10(b) is not 
extraterritorial, neither is Rule 10b-5.”
 
90  After examining the text of the 
statute, the Court concluded that textually, nothing in the statute points 
to extraterritorial application.91  Rejecting the Solicitor General’s 
position that the definition of “interstate commerce” as defined by 
section § 10(b) includes “trade, commerce, transportation, or 
communication . . . between any foreign country and any State 
(emphasis added),” the Court held that that this reference to interstate 
commerce does not defeat the presumption against extraterritorial 
jurisdiction as set forth in Aramco.92  “[E]ven statutes that contain broad 
language in the definition of commerce that expressly refer to ‘foreign 
commerce’ do not apply abroad.”93  However, the Court affirmed that 
liability is possible if an issuer abroad publishes information in the 
United States, or otherwise uses the means and instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce to make material misrepresentations that ultimately 
affect the price of their shares traded on a domestic exchange.94
The petitioners and the Solicitor General offered two other bases 
that support extraterritorial application.
 
95
 
 89. Id. at 2880-81 (citing articles that are critical of the Second Circuit’s approach 
to extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
 The first is that Congress, in its 
legislative history of the ‘34 Act, observed that “such transactions are 
generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and 
foreign countries,” thereby suggesting it intended extraterritorial 
 90. Id. at 2881 (internal quotations omitted) (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. 642, 651 (1997)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 2882. 
 93. Id. at 2882 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 
251 (1991)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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application.96  The second is that § 30(b) of the ‘34 Act provides that 
“[t]he provisions of the [‘34 Act] shall not apply to any person [that] . . . 
transacts . . . without the jurisdiction of the United States,” unless they 
transact with the purpose of evading the regulations promulgated under 
the Act.”97  The Solicitor General argued that such a law would be 
meaningless if extraterritorial application did not already apply to the 
securities laws.98
The Court responded to the first argument by noting that the same 
section quoted by the Petitioners and Solicitor General also limited its 
reach to “transactions . . . conducted upon securities exchanges . . . [that] 
are affected with a national public interest” (emphasis added).
 
99 The 
Court asserted that such an interest does not pertain to foreign 
exchanges, and thereby failed to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.100  Moreover, the Solicitor General’s inference that a 
foreigner’s evasion of the securities laws indicate extraterritoriality, 
while possible, is not sufficient to override the presumption.101
In sum, the Court quoted from the ‘34 Act an actual provision “for 
[] specific extraterritorial application,” stating that the purpose of which 
“would be quite superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already 
applied to transactions on foreign exchanges,” thus confirming its 
textual analysis of the extraterritorial application of section 10(b), and 
effectively ruling against it.”
 
102
D. CLARIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF  
§10(B) AND ITS PROPER APPLICATION 
 
The Court then turned to the Petitioner’s alternate argument that the 
Respondent’s alleged deceptive conduct and misrepresentations had 
occurred in Florida and that such action mitigated the need to find an 
extraterritorial application of the securities laws.103
 
 96. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
  The Court 
 97. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 98. Id. (the Court specifically points to the fact that the amicus curiae brief for the 
United States makes no mention of a regulation promulgated under §30(b)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 2883. 
 102. Id. (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78dd(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo 
(2006)). 
 103. Id. at 2883-84. 
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responded that “it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial applications 
that lacks all contact with the . . . United States,” stating that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality would be utterly anemic if its 
application was dismissed anytime there was some minutiae of domestic 
contact.104
In Aramco, the Court looked to what Congress’ concern was at the 
time legislation was enacted, rather than the historical events leading up 
to it.
 
105  The ‘34 Act applies to deceptive conduct and misrepresentations 
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange” (failing to mention that the location of the 
deception is dispositive when determining application of the law), 
therefore invoking the presumption against extraterritorial application.106  
The Court makes clear that section 10(b) seeks to regulate only 
“purchase-and-sale transactions” and the respective parties to those 
transactions only when they are in securities listed on domestic 
exchanges.107  Moreover, the Court adds this phrase in section 10(b) 
referring to securities registered on “national securities exchanges” 
would be nonsensical if the presumption against extraterritoriality didn’t 
apply.108  The phrase could have read more simply “all purchases and 
sales of securities” and covered all securities sold in all territories.109  
The Court also refers to the ‘33 Act’s registration requirement and how 
the SEC had interpreted the rule “not to include offer and sales that 
occur outside the United States.”110
Finally, the Court turned to the issue of international comity, when 
  Given that the ‘33 Act and the ‘34 
Act were enacted within one year of each other and the ‘34 Act 
requirements seem to naturally follow out of the securities registered 
under the ‘33 Act, the Court naturally assumed that its jurisdiction did so 
as well. 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (noting that in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), 
even though the Title VII plaintiff had been hired in the United States and was a U.S. 
citizen, the employment situation in question had occurred outside of the United States; 
Congress’ clear intent was on domestic employment and had effectively barred the 
claim from being heard). 
 106. Id. (citing to Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78j(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo 
(2006)). See also SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
 107. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883-84. 
 108. Id. at 2885. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (citing to 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (2009)). 
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it stated that if “Congress intended such foreign application it would 
have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and 
procedures.”111  Citing from the amicus curiae briefs of multiple nations, 
the Court discussed how each country has its own judicial processes, the 
likes of which will not always correspond with that of the United 
States.112 Moreover, the Court discussed how foreign apprehension at 
section 10(b)’s application abroad without a bright-line test would 
interfere with a foreign nation’s securities regulation and overall judicial 
sovereignty.113
Ultimately, restricting the ‘34 Act’s application for transactions 
occurring in the United States or involving securities listed on a 
domestic exchange reflects the jurisprudential concerns of the Court.
 
114  
The Court rejected the significant conduct test used for decades by the 
Second Circuit and applied by the SEC,115 explaining that the Court’s 
function is “to give the statute the effect its language suggests” and 
nothing more.116
IV. THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM  
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
  This decision later came into the sights of Congress 
while they were drafting the Dodd-Frank Act. 
A. BACKGROUND: THE CREDIT CRISIS 
In the years following a U.S. housing bubble fueled by, among 
other things, easy access to credit, the U.S. economy weakened while 
the housing market went into a free-fall, the recovery of which would be 
years in the making.117
 
 111. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
  One of the most significant factors in the 
 112. Id. at 2885-86 (referring to the amicus curiae briefs for the United Kingdom, 
Australia, France, and various foreign chambers of commerce, financial associations, 
and foreign corporations). 
 113. Id. at 2886. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 2887-88 (citing to earlier SEC decisions In re United Sec. Clearing Corp., 
52 S.E.C. 92, 95 n.14, 96 n.16, (1994) and In re Robert F. Lynch, Exchange Act 
Release No. 11,737, 8 SEC Docket 75, 77 n.15 (1975)). 
 116. Id. at 2886 (citing to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae referring to the 
possibility of the United States becoming a “Barbary Coast” for securities fraud). 
 117. See Ruth Mantell, Home Prices Off Record 18% in Past Year, Case-Shiller 
Says, MARKETWATCH,  Dec. 30, 2008, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/home-
prices-off-record-18-in-past-year-case-shiller-says. 
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housing crisis and ensuing economic meltdown was the wide availability 
of credit to non-creditworthy individuals in the form of subprime 
mortgages.118  Many corporations became enamored with the subprime 
market and the billions that came with originating and subsequently 
securitizing these loans.119  The market for such asset-backed securities 
was insatiable.  The banks that were heavily invested in mortgage 
backed securities took the largest losses.120
B. LEHMAN FAILS; OTHERS GIANTS BEGIN TO FALTER 
  Case in point: Lehman 
Brothers and its eventual demise. 
Following a weekend of intense negotiation with Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson, government officials, and executives from 
some of the largest banks in the nation, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
was not able to find itself a buyer.121  Lehman subsequently filed a 
petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York in what would 
become the “largest failure of an investment bank since the collapse of 
Drexel Burnham Lambert 18 years ago.”122  Underscoring the impact of 
this crisis, Merrill Lynch & Co Inc. was purchased by Bank of America 
for $50 billion after suffering significant losses due to the plummeting 
value of its CDO (collateralized debt obligation) portfolio.123
C.  A CALL TO ACTION 
 
During the next few months, Wall Street, and the financial services 
 
 118. See Mara Lee, Subprime Mortgages: A Primer, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 23, 
2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9085408 (discussing 
subprime mortgages). See also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT (2011), available at http://fcic.gov/report. 
 119. See generally ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, UNDERSTANDING THE 
SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT (2008), available at http://www.ny. 
frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr318.pdf. 
 120. See Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited June 19, 2011). 
 121. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1; see also Sam Mamudi, Lehman Folds With Record $613 
Billion Debt, MARKETWATCH, Sept. 15, 2008, available at http://www.marketwatch. 
com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt?siteid=rss. 
 122. See Sorkin, Lehman Files, supra note 121. 
 123. See id. 
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sector in general, suffered massive losses leading to the government 
bailout of many banks that were considered “too big to fail.”124  These 
events, having had many economic repercussions around the globe, led 
legislators to call for stronger and more thorough government oversight 
of the financial markets.  On June 17, 2009, in a speech to financial 
industry representatives at the White House, President Obama called for 
“a sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a 
transformation on a scale not seen since the reforms that followed the 
Great Depression.”125  The following day, the Treasury Department 
released a plan with recommendations as to what changes were needed 
in order to ensure future stability and restoration of “confidence in the 
integrity of our financial system.”126
Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) and Senator Chris Dodd (D-
CT) spearheaded the initiative to pass legislation in their respective 
chambers of Congress.  The earliest provisions closely paralleled the 
Obama administration’s plan for financial reform.
 
127 After months of 
contentious debate and intense media coverage, the House of 
Representatives passed a version of the financial reform bill, known as 
the “Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act”128 
(“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”) on December 12th, 2009.129  The Senate 
followed suit, and on May 20th, 2010 voted in favor of the bill.130
 
 124. For a thorough (and occasionally riveting) analysis of the Financial and 
Subprime Credit Crisis, see generally ANDREW R. SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE 
INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM – AND THEMSELVES (2009). 
 
Thereafter, President Obama signed the Act into law on July 21, 2010—
 125. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Twenty-First Century Financial 
Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform/.  See also Obama’s 
Financial Reform Plan: The Condensed Version, WASHINGTON WIRE,  
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/06/17/obamas-financial-reform-plan-the-
condensed-version/tab/article/ (last visited June 19, 2011). 
 126. See THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS113933 (last visited June 19, 2011). 
 127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 128. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 129. See H.R. Res. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).  
 130. S. Res. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted). 
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almost a month to the day after the Morrison decision.131
D. THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S IMPACT ON SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS 
 
In its final form, the Act comprehensively addressed a host of 
financial regulatory concerns including, for example, the orderly 
liquidation of unsound institutions132, the regulation of hedge funds and 
derivatives133, and the protection of consumers.134
1. Section 929p - Strengthening Enforcement by the Commission 
  For our purposes, 
however, we draw upon sections 929p and 929y of the Act, discussed in 
further detail below. 
Section 929p(b)(1) explicitly provides for the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of the securities laws under section 17(a) of the ‘33 Act, for 
alleged violations involving “(1) conduct within the United States that 
constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the 
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only 
foreign investors,” or “(2) conduct occurring outside the United States 
that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.”135  
The law effectively codified the “conduct and effects” test extensively 
relied upon by the Second Circuit for the past four decades prior to its 
abrogation by the Supreme Court in Morrison.136  In addition, section 
929p(b)(2) codified the “conduct and effects” test with respect to any 
alleged violations of the antifraud provisions under the ‘34 Act.137  
Finally, section 929p(b)(3) codified the conduct and substantial effects 
test for violations of section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 
1940.138
 
 131. Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, July 
21, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/ 
22regulate.html?hp. 
 
 132. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 128, § 204(a). 
 133. See id. § 723(a)(3) (adding §§ 2(h)(1)(A) and 2(h)(2)(B)(i) to the Commodity 
Exchange Act, which require clearing of swaps and regulation of swap dealers); see 
also id. § 731 (requiring registration and regulation of swap dealers). 
 134. See id. § 1011 (establishing the independent Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection with the Federal Reserve Board). 
 135. Id. § 929p(b)(1). 
 136. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 137. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 128, § 929p(b)(2). 
 138. Id. § 929p(b)(3). 
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2. Section 929y - Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action 
Interestingly, under section 929p, the Act only authorizes 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for actions brought “by the Commission or 
the United States,” and not private party actions.  Section 929y, 
however, cures this apparent defect by mandating the SEC to “solicit 
public comment and thereafter conduct a study to determine the extent 
to which private rights of action under the antifraud provisions” should 
be extended to cover conduct or transactions outside the United 
States.139
The SEC, under the direction of Congress, is tasked with analyzing 
multiple issues, including: 
 
(1) the scope of such a private right of action, including whether it 
should extend to all private actors or whether it should be more 
limited to apply only to institutional investors or otherwise; 
(2) what implications such a private right of action would have on 
international comity; 
(3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of 
action for transnational securities frauds; and 
(4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should be adopted.140
The report is to be submitted no later than eighteen months 
following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.
 
141
 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXTENSION OF THE CONDUCT AND EFFECTS 
TEST TO PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION 
 
A. DODD-FRANK IS INEFFECTIVE IN ITS ATTEMPT  
AT RESURRECTING F-CUBED LITIGATION 
A convincingly strong case could be made that Section 929p of 
 
 139. Id. § 929y. See Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-63174 (Oct. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/other/2010/34-63174.pdf, for further information on the comments being solicited 
and important dates. 
 140. Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, supra note 139. 
 141. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 128, § 929y(c). 
594 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
Dodd-Frank has not effectively reversed the core holding of Morrison.  
The Dodd-Frank Act states in relevant part that “[t]he district courts of 
the United States and the United States courts of any Territory shall 
have jurisdiction. . . alleging a violation . . . even if the securities 
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign 
investors . . . .”142
Significantly, the legislative text makes no mention of any change 
in the application of the securities laws.  Rather it only speaks directly to 
a court’s ability to hear a case, a power fully recognized by the majority 
in Morrison.
 
143  In a recent publication, the attorney for the respondents 
in Morrison argued that “[t]he [section 929p] provision unambiguously 
addresses only the ‘jurisdiction’ of the ‘district courts of the United 
States’ to hear cases involving extraterritorial elements; its language 
clearly does not expand the geographic scope of any substantive 
regulatory provision.”144  Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote in Morrison that 
“[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction . . . refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a 
case,” summarily finding that the district court enjoyed subject matter 
jurisdiction over the dispute.145  The more probing question of “what 
conduct section 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct section 10(b) 
prohibits,” Scalia continued, “is a merits question.”146
Simply ‘extending’ a court’s jurisdiction to extraterritorial 
application in foreign cubed cases does not suffice and may (and should) 
ultimately render section 929p irrelevant unless an amendment is passed 
to clarify the applicable scope of the securities laws.  Admittedly, the 
Act was poorly and hastily drafted because the legislative history of the 
Act, found in the Congressional Record, reveals that “the provisions 
  Congress, in an 
act of oversight in the Dodd-Frank Act, therefore failed to satisfactorily 
address the threshold issue in Morrison – namely, the extraterritoriality 
of the U.S. securities laws. 
 
 142. Id. § 929p(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 143. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia ruled that the district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute.  The extraterritorial reach of the securities laws, 
he added, must be treated as a merit-based (and not jurisdictional) issue. See Morrison 
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
 144. George T. Conway III, Extraterritoriality After Dodd Frank, THE HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/extraterritoriality-after-dodd-frank/ 
(last visited June 19, 2011). 
 145. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (internal quotations omitted). 
 146. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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concerning extraterritoriality . . .  are intended to rebut [the Supreme 
Court’s presumption against extraterritoriality] by clearly indicating that 
Congress intends extraterritorial application in cases brought by the SEC 
or the Justice Department.”147
must adopt the interpretation of the statute that is most faithful to its 
text . . . [i]f Congress enacted into law something different from 
what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its 
intent . . .  [i]t is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its 
drafting errors. . . .
  And while “given the drafters’ extra-
statutory statements, some judges may be tempted to find substantive 
extraterritorial[ity],” the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that 
courts: 
148
It may be possible that this careless drafting has to do with the fact 
that the total number of lawyer-legislators in Congress has been on the 
decline, thereby possibly causing a disconnect between legislative intent 
and judicial interpretation.
 
149
Whatever the reason may be for this careless mistake, a district 
court hearing this case already has precedent, in Morrison, to follow in 
determining whether there is extraterritorial application to the securities 
laws. Without a clear amendment stating that the securities laws apply to 
what are essentially purely foreign transactions, a court should rule 
 
 
 147. 156 CONG. REC. H5235, H5237 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. 
Paul Kanjorski), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage. 
cgi?position=all&page=H5237&dbname=2010_record. 
 148. Harbison v. Bell, 129 S.Ct. 1481, 1494 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). 
 149. Compare 110th Congress Lawyers-Legislators: U.S. Senate, ABANET.ORG, 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/documents/lawyerleg110thsenate_nofooter.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2010) (listing the percentage of the 110th Senate that are lawyers at 
59%) and 110th Congress Lawyers-Legislators: U.S. House of Representatives, 
ABANET.ORG, 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/documents/lawyerleg110thhouse_nofooter.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2010) (listing the percentage of the 110th House of Representatives that 
are lawyers at 40%), with 111th Congress Lawyers-Legislators: U.S. Senate, 
ABANET.ORG, 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/documents/lawyers111congress_senate.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2010) (listing the percentage of the 110th Senate that are lawyers at 58%) and 
111th Congress Lawyers-Legislators: U.S. House of Representatives, ABANET.ORG, 
http://new.abanet.org/calendar/ABAday/Documents/LawyersCongressHouse2010.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (listing the percentage of the 110th House of Representatives 
that are lawyers at 36%). 
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against the application.  Borrowing from Justice Scalia’s reasoning in 
Morrison, in order for a law to apply extraterritorially it must have “a 
clear statement of extraterritorial effect (emphasis added).”  Any 
amendment referencing jurisdiction and not application of the law only 
speaks to the power of the court to hear the case, and not whether it can 
apply the law to particular facts.150
Further support for this argument may materialize when we see 
how the SEC interprets this amendment in prosecuting cases of 
extraterritorial fraud that occurred prior to Dodd-Frank’s enactment.  If 
the SEC argues that the Dodd-Frank amendment actually changes how 
the courts rule on the merits of an extraterritoriality issue, rather than 
subject-matter jurisdiction, then there may be a successful defense 
against ex-post facto application of a law, subsequently causing cases to 
be dismissed. However, if the SEC argues that it is merely jurisdictional 
(i.e. that the amendment was written to address subject-matter 
jurisdiction) then the case could be dismissed because Morrison rejects 
extraterritorial application, even while already affirming jurisdiction. 
 
Take for example the recent case of Fabrice Tourre, a former 
Goldman Sachs employee who is being prosecuted under the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws for his role in the development 
and marketing of what the SEC alleges to be a fraudulent CDO.151  On 
September 29, 2010, Mr. Tourre’s counsel filed a motion for a judgment 
on the pleadings arguing that the case be dismissed under Morrison 
since the investment in question did not include any transactions that 
occurred in the United States, was not listed on any exchange, and 
moreover that the investor was a foreigner.152  After responding, the 
SEC was given the opportunity to file an amended complaint, doing so 
on November 22, 2010, and arguing that Mr. Tourre gave “substantial 
assistance [to Goldman Sachs] as it misled investors in a product linked 
to subprime mortgages.”153
 
 150. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (internal quotations omitted). 
  Such an argument leads one to believe that 
 151. For a thorough explanation of the details and background of this action, see 
SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud In Connection With the Structuring and 
Marketing of a Synthetic CDO, SEC Litig. Release No. 21,489, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm (last visited June 19, 2011). 
 152. SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229, 2010 WL 4520689 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 29, 2010). 
 153. Joshua Gallu, Goldman Sachs’s Tourre Facing New Claim in SEC Lawsuit, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-
24/goldman-sachs-s-tourre-facing-additional-sec-claim-on-subprime-mortgages.html. 
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the SEC is abandoning its fraud claim in light of Morrison, and is taking 
a different approach, perhaps for the reasons mentioned above. 
Therefore, given the apparent lack of effectiveness of section 929p, 
foreign-cubed litigation brought in federal court should be dismissed 
under Morrison.  No extraterritorial effect can be provided to a statute 
unless its provisions clearly provide for its application not only 
jurisdiction.  Unfortunately for the drafters of Dodd-Frank, their 
hastiness in bringing this amendment to vote likely ended up with a bill 
as impotent as the Second Circuit jurisprudence it was based on. 
B. CONTINUED LACK OF CLARITY: THE NEED FOR A SAFE HARBOR 
Assuming the courts reject the above-proffered interpretation of 
how the Dodd-Frank amendment was written, and embrace 
extraterritorial application for securities laws enforcement, an 
overarching issue is that, while Congress has seemingly attempted to 
adopt the conduct and effects tests, what actually constitutes fulfillment 
of these tests by a foreign issuer is unclear due to the differing court 
positions on the issue and continued lack of legislative clarity.  
Moreover, different circuits have applied the effects differently, with 
some ruling that a satisfaction of both tests is required, whereas some 
have held that the tests are mutually exclusive of one another.154
This issue is extremely important as “[c]urrently, it is unclear to 
what extent the effects test is applicable [and] [a]s a result, corporations, 
issuers, lawyers, and the business community do not know what 
constitutes a substantial effect or what behavior abroad might affect U.S. 
securities.”
 
155  This has led to “foreign issuers hav[ing] taken great pains 
to deny the sale of securities to U.S. investors” because they are “wary 
of being haled into U.S. courts and subjected to broad U.S. discovery 
procedures should the price of stock fall.”156
 
 154. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. 
  Not only is this a detriment 
to the issuers in that they cannot access the vast wealth of this nation, 
barring U.S. investors from foreign investments has the effect of 
preventing them from reaping potentially substantial returns, especially 
 155. See John D. Kelly, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for a New U.S. 
Jurisprudence with Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud 
Provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts,  28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 477, 
493 (1997). 
 156. Id. 
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with regard to emerging foreign markets who are desperately seeking 
outside investment.157  Therefore, if the courts do embrace the intent of 
Dodd-Frank, and reject a textual reading of the statute, it is imperative 
that the SEC, either through a rule or release, adopts a set of factors that 
would provide foreigners a safe harbor to follow in order to avoid costly 
litigation in U.S. courts.158
C. ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY 
  Such a rule would likely ease the concerns of 
many foreign issuers, who would have an official guide to look to which 
provides for more foreign opportunities for domestic investors. 
Finally, going beyond the textual argument that can be made 
against extraterritorial application, there are common sense 
jurisprudential arguments as to why jurisdiction should not be extended.  
A major issue is comity and whether other nations would respect and 
enforce the judgments of U.S. federal courts on issues that may have 
been better off litigated in their respective courts.159  Applying the 
securities laws broadly to foreign transactions would “interfere with the 
regulatory systems of other countries . . . [causing] U.S. interference [to] 
generate confusion and multiply the costs to investors and issuers.160
 
 157. “Growth in emerging markets will accelerate faster than in developed nations 
as economies mature and leaders are quicker to make structural changes.” Cordell 
Eddings & Tom Keene, Emerging Market Growth Gap to Widen, El-Erian Says: Tom 
Keene, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 9, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-
09/emerging-developed-world-growth-gap-will-widen-el-erian-says-tom-keene.html. 
  In 
addition it would cause “tension between the United States and other 
countries . . . [possibly leading] other countries [to] retaliate, seeking to 
 158. The SEC has much experience providing issuers with safe harbors to follow, 
especially with foreign securities. See Regulation S -- Rules Governing Offers and Sales 
Made Outside the United States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 
http://taft.law.uc.edu/CCL/33ActRls/regS.html (last visited June 19, 2011) (providing 
an example of an SEC safe harbor affecting foreign issuers). 
 159. “Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the 
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition 
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts 
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to 
the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its 
laws.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). 
 160. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking The 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 914 (1998). 
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regulate activities of U.S. parties that impact their countries.”161  Courts 
seeking to apply extraterritorial jurisdiction “must [also] consider the 
political impact of applying U.S. law on international relations, U.S. 
foreign policy, and the development of multinational business.”162  
Finally, extraterritorial application could “produce undesirable results 
such as redundant and unnecessarily costly systems of overlapping 
regulation, [that] would thereby impede the free flow of capital across 
borders.”163
Looking at the number of amicus briefs that were filed in favor of 
the respondents in the Morrison case, it is clear that there is a large 
group of foreign nations that reject U.S. extraterritoriality in this 
aspect.
  The SEC must consider these potential political and 
economic ramifications when applying extraterritorial jurisdiction for 
both public and (after the conclusion of the Congressionally-mandated 
study) private actions. 
164  The possibility for confusion and conflict of laws between 
nations is immense in today’s global economy. Therefore it is 
imperative that practitioners, academia, and foreign nations voice their 
disapproval with this expansion of U.S. judicial power and urge the SEC 
in this open comment period to restrict extraterritorial application of the 
securities laws to both governmental and private party causes of 
action.165
 
 161. Id. 
 
 
 162. Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign 
Tender Offers, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 523, 554 (1993). 
 163. Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The 
Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter 
Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 102 (2003). 
 164. Among the groups that filed amicus briefs in support of the respondent are the 
U.K., Australia, France, the New York Stock Exchange, Euronext, The Swiss Bankers 
Association, Economiesuisse, The Federation of German Industries, The French 
Business Confederation, The Institute of International Bankers, The European Banking 
Federation, the Australian Bankers’ Association, Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America, the United States Council for International 
Business, the Association Francaise des Entreprises Privees, GC100, European 
Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. N.V., Alstom SA, Lagardere Groupe SCA, Thales 
SA, Technip SA, Vivendi SA, and law professors. 
 165. See Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, supra note 139. 
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CONCLUSION 
While it is clear that Congress intended to extend the reach of the 
securities laws and the SEC’s ability to enforce them, careless drafting 
and a lack of clarity probably preclude Dodd-Frank from having the 
intended effect. Moreover, if the Dodd-Frank amendment is not 
interpreted by courts textually, but rather by looking to Congress’ 
legislative intent, the SEC should clarify the boundaries and limits of the 
“conduct” and “effects” tests for the sake of predictability and 
uniformity among the courts.  Finally, for the sake of international 
comity, restraint should be used when applying laws extraterritorially. 
